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Abstract—In dynamic streaming, a user can dynamically
choose from different versions of the same video. In P2P dynamic
streaming, there is one P2P swarm for each version, and within
a swarm, peers can share video chunks with each other, thereby
reducing the server’s bandwidth cost. Due to economy of scale,
cooperation among peers can also reduce the per-peer content
price. In this paper, we use cooperative game theory to dynam-
ically assign each peer to a version. To maximally incentivize
peer cooperation, we use mechanism design to develop pricing
schemes that reﬂect content and bandwidth cost savings derived
from peer cooperation. With this approach, each peer is assigned
to a swarm that is commensurate with its upload contribution
and the price it is willing to pay. We also develop and simulate
a distributed dynamic P2P streaming algorithm, consisting of
chunk scheduling, token-based accounting, and video version
switching, to dynamically adjust each peer’s video version based
on the collaborative behaviors of all peers.
I. INTRODUCTION
The newest trend of video streaming on the Internet is
dynamic adaptive streaming, where a video is encoded into
multiple versions, with each version delivered at a different bit
rate. When starting a video session, a user selects a version
to stream to match the available resources on his device,
such as network bandwidth, screen rendering capability, and
current battery level, etc. After the session starts, the user can
further switch versions as his resource availability changes [1].
Dynamic adaptive streaming has been widely deployed to
provide uninterrupted video streaming service to users [2],
[3], [4]. While all deployed solutions to date are server-
based [5], [6], [7], the Peer-to-Peer (P2P) paradigm has great
potential to enhance the dynamic streaming service. In P2P
dynamic streaming, there is one P2P swarm for each version,
within a swarm, peers watching the same version share video
chunks with each other. P2P video sharing reduces the server’s
bandwidth cost and makes high-quality video versions more
accessible when the server has limited capacity. In addition,
due to economy of scale, cooperation between peers also
provides them an edge in negotiating lower content prices with
content providers.
The key design question for P2P dynamic streaming is:
which version should each peer watch? In server-only dynamic
streaming, each user’s own resources largely determine which
version the user watches. In P2P dynamic streaming, video
version selections on all peers are tightly coupled. Isolated
version selections by individual peers are not sustainable, and
cannot fully exploit the cooperation gain. As with any P2P
system, the success of P2P dynamic streaming hinges on peers
pooling their resources and cooperating. Intuitively, to provide
incentives for cooperation, peers contributing more resources
should be rewarded by receiving a high-quality version.
In this paper, we formally investigate the incentive issues
of P2P dynamic streaming under a cooperative game theory
framework. Cooperative game theory systematically studies
mechanisms that encourage and sustain cooperation among
self-optimizing agents. In a traditional cooperative game, each
agent is a potential customer for a service, for which there
is a charge for receiving the service. Collaboration among
agents can potentially reduce individual service charges. With
a properly designed pricing mechanism, maximal cooperation
will be fostered and sustained. One salient feature of P2P
streaming is that each peer is simultaneously a customer and
a server. Another salient feature of P2P dynamic streaming
is that there are multiple services, namely, the versions with
different viewing qualities.
We study P2P dynamic streaming as a cooperative game,
where peers watching the same version will form a cooperation
set, and a peer’s strategy therefore is not simply whether it
should join a cooperation set, but instead which cooperation
set to join and how much to contribute to the selected
cooperation set. In our cooperative game, each peer bids with
the maximum price he is willing to pay for the video and with
his upload capacity. Based on peer bids, we use mechanism
design to device pricing schemes for all video versions that
reﬂect content and bandwidth cost savings derived from peer
cooperation, as well as individual peer’s upload contribution.
Given each peer’s bid and video prices at all versions, the
mechanism determines the peers that can watch the highest-
rate version while covering the server’s cost (content and
bandwidth) for providing the highest-rate video to the swarm.
Typically a peer that is willing to contribute a large amount of
upload bandwidth and is willing to pay a relatively high price
will be assigned to the highest-rate swarm. Peers who are not
assigned to the highest-rate swarm are considered for the next-
highest rate swarm, and so on. Each peer is therefore assigned
to a swarm that is commensurate with its upload contribution
and the price it is willing to pay. Due to the cooperation gain
on bandwidth and content price, the version to which a peer is
assigned also depends on the version assignments for the other
peers. We show that our pricing mechanisms can foster and
sustain cooperation across different video versions. We also
show that our pricing mechanisms are group-strategy-proof,
i.e., peers are incentivized to bid their true upload capacities
and their true maximum prices.
Using insights obtained from the game-theoretic analysis,
we develop a multi-swarm dynamic P2P streaming system,consisting of distributed P2P chunk scheduling algorithm,
token-based accounting scheme that implements our video
pricing schemes derived from cooperative game theory, and
video version switching strategy that dynamically adjust each
peer’s video version based on the collaborative behaviors of all
peers. Through chunk-level simulations, we demonstrate that
our proposed incentive mechanisms can maximally incentivize
heterogeneous peers to participate in P2P dynamic streaming.
This paper is organized as follows. We describe related
work in the Section II. In Section III, we ﬁrst brieﬂy review
cooperative game theory, we then apply cooperative game the-
ory to single-version systems, and ﬁnally to multiple version
systems. In Section IV, we describe our distributed dynamic
P2P streaming algorithm, for which we provide simulation
results in Section V. The paper is concluded in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Most research on dynamic adaptive streaming is based on
the HTTP client/server architecture. Netﬂix [8] is currently
one of the largest adaptive video streaming providers in the
world. Its high-level system architecture is studied in [9]
and more ﬁne-grained architecture is studied in [10]. The
performance of three popular HTTP adaptive streaming clients
– the Netﬂix, Microsoft Smooth Streaming [11], and Adobe
OSMF [12] clients – are compared in [3]. P2P streaming
systems, such as PPLive [13] and PPStream [14], have been
widely studied [15], [16], [17], [18], [19]. But none of them
studied P2P dynamic streaming.
Incentive mechanism design is crucial to P2P systems.
In [20], Chu et al. introduced taxation to P2P steaming to
balance social welfare and individual welfare in the whole
P2P community. In [21], Levin et al. proposed an auction
solution to motivate users of BitTorrent [22] to share their
upload bandwidth. In [23], Aperjis et al. developed a content
pricing algorithm to encourage peers to share content in P2P
system. There are also some previous work using game theory
to study P2P incentives. In [24], Buragohain et al use game
theory to study the interaction of strategic and rational peers,
and propose a differential service-based incentive scheme to
improve the system performance. In a more closely related
work to this paper, [25], Misra et al use Shapely value to study
the ideal incentive structure in P2P systems. They showed that,
as the number of peers increases, the Shapley value received by
each peer approaches a ﬂuid limit, which can be obtained by a
simple closed form expression. The book [26] systematically
introduces game theory and related algorithms, and it has
extensive coverage on cooperative games and cost sharing.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to use
cooperative game theory to develop incentive mechanisms for
P2P dynamic streaming.
III. COOPERATIVE GAMES FOR P2P STREAMING
A. Review of Cooperative Games and Cost-sharing
We begin with a short review of cooperative games and
cost-sharing relevant to our study. (See [26] for a more detailed
overview.) In a cooperative game, a set of agents are interested
in receiving a service, but not all agents are necessarily
provided the service. The total service cost is determined by
the subset of agents that are provided the service, i.e, the
cooperation (coalition) set. Cooperative game theory studies
how to design cost-sharing mechanisms to encourage and
sustain cooperation among agents.
Let (A;c) denote a cost-sharing game, where A is a set of
agents interested in receiving a service, c : 2A ! R is the
cost function of providing the service to any subset of agents.
A cost-sharing scheme is a function that for each coalition
S  A, assigns a cost allocation for all agents in S. Formally,
it is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 1: A Cost-sharing Scheme is a function  : A
2A ! R such that, for every S  A, (i;S) = 0 for all i = 2 S,
and (i;S) 2 R for all i 2 S.1 A cost-sharing scheme  is
budget balanced if
P
i2S (i;S) = c(S) for all S  A.
A cost sharing scheme determines, for any participating set
of agents, the prices each agent has to pay. To determine
the participating set, the service provider conducts an auction
among the potential agents, and selects the agents based on
the bids and the cost sharing scheme . Speciﬁcally, let vi
be the utility of agent i for receiving the service, i.e., the
maximum amount that agent i is willing to pay to receive
the service. Suppose, for now, each agent i truthfully bids its
utility vi. A service set S is said to be incentive-compatible
if fvi  (i;S);8i 2 Sg. After all the agents bid, the service
provider simply determines all the incentive-compatible ser-
vice sets, chooses one such set S (typically the largest), and
assigns the cost sharing (i;S) to each agent i in S.
But in practice, without a properly designed cost-sharing
mechanism , a self-optimizing agent (or a coalition) may not
bid truthfully in order to increase its proﬁt vi1(i 2 S) (i;S),
where 1() is the indicator function. One of the goals of
cooperative game theory is to design a balanced cost-sharing
mechanism  that incentivizes all users to bid their actual
utility values. To this end, we need the following deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 2: Given a cost-sharing game (A;c) and a vector
b = fbi;i 2 Ag of service bids from all agents, a cost-sharing
mechanism is an algorithm that determines a set S(b)  A
of agents to be serviced and a vector p(b) = fpi;i 2 Ag
of payments that the agents make to the service provider.
(S(b);p(b)) is referred as the output of the cost-sharing
mechanism.
Algorithm 1 Cost Sharing Mechanism M(A;b)
1: Initialize Q   A.
2: Repeat
3: Let Q   fi 2 Q : bi  (i;Q)g.
4: Until for all i 2 Q;bi  (i;Q).
5: Return S = Q and pi = (i;Q), 8i 2 Q, pi = 0, 8i = 2 Q
An example cost sharing mechanism, M, is given by
Algorithm 1. Note that the mechanism is generated from a
1For generality, we don’t require the cost allocation to be non-negative.cost-sharing scheme  and a bidding vector b (which may
not be truthful). A highly desirable property of a cost-sharing
mechanism is that it provides incentives to agents to bid
truthfully. This concept is formalized as follows:
Deﬁnition 3: Let b = fbi = vi;8i 2 Ag be the truthful bid
vector. Let C  A be a bidding coalition of agents, and b
0
be a
strategically chosen new bid vector, with b
0
i = bi;8i = 2 C. Let
(S;p) and (S
0
;p
0
) denote the outputs of the mechanism when
the bids are b and b
0
, respectively. A cost-sharing mechanism
is group-strategyproof if for every coalition C of agents, if the
inequality bi1(i 2 S0)   p
0
i  bi1(i 2 S)   pi holds for every
i 2 C, then it holds with equality for every i 2 C.
One of the principal goals in cooperative game theory is
to ﬁnd group-strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms. Under a
group-strategyproof mechanism, there is no beneﬁt for agents
(as well as groups of agents) to lie about their utilities.
Deﬁnition 4: A cost-sharing scheme  is cross-monotone if
for all S;T  A, (i;S)  (i;S [ T) for all i 2 S.
Intuitively, a cross-monotone cost-sharing scheme provides
incentives for agents to form larger cooperation sets to achieve
lower per-agent charges. The following two theorems are
classic results from cooperative game theory [26]:
Theorem 1: Suppose  is a cross-monotone cost sharing
scheme for the cooperative game (A;c) and b = fbi;i 2 Ag
is a bidding vector. Then there is a unique maximal service set
S(b)  A such that for any set S satisfying the property that
bi  (i;S) for all i 2 S, we have S  S(b). Furthermore,
M in Algorithm 1 returns the maximal service set S(b).
Theorem 2: If  is cross-monotonic cost-sharing scheme,
then M is a group-strategyproof cost sharing mechanism.
The above two theorems indicate why the concept of cross-
monotone cost-sharing scheme  and the mechanism M from
Algorithm 1 are important. Speciﬁcally, if the cost-sharing
scheme is cross monotone, under the mechanism M, every
agent bids its his true utility value, bi = vi, and M returns
the maximal service set S(v) such that vi  (i;S(v)) for
all i 2 S(v).
B. Cost-sharing Mechanism for Single Version P2P Streaming
In P2P video streaming, cooperation between peers can
give gains in both content and bandwidth. In this section,
we apply cooperative game theory to study how to share the
cost of a video streaming service among participating peers.
One unique feature of this P2P streaming game is that a
peer’s participation in the service set can potentially reduce
the system-wide bandwidth cost.
We start with the basic P2P streaming cooperative game
where only one video version is available, and where each
peer bids to see the video. We will extend this basic game to
P2P streaming with multiple versions in the next subsection.
We normalize the video rate to be 1 (and normalize the link
bandwidths accordingly). We denote by A the set of peers
interested in this video. Without loss of generality, we assume
each peer in A has download bandwidth larger than the video
rate. For peer i, its upload bandwidth is denoted by ui and its
utility for watching the video is vi.
1) Service Cost: To serve a set S of peers, the server’s cost
can be calculated by
c(S) = cc(S) + cd(S); (1)
where cc(S) is the total content cost and cd(S) is the total
distribution cost for streaming the video to all peers in S. We
assume the server content cost cc(S) is an increasing concave
function of jSj. In other words, the server incurs decreasing
marginal content cost for serving additional peers. Without
P2P sharing, the distribution cost cd(S) is wjSj, where w
is the cost per unit server bandwidth. When peer-assisted
distribution is employed, video sharing between peers can
signiﬁcantly ofﬂoad the server, thereby reducing the server
distribution cost. In P2P streaming, the upload contribution of
a peer is determined by its upload bandwidth as well as the
efﬁciency of the P2P streaming algorithm in utilizing peers’
upload bandwidth. As demonstrated in [27], if all peers are
fully connected, all peers’ upload capacity can be fully utilized
to achieve high video streaming rate. In real P2P systems,
however, a peer in a larger swarm has a better chance to ﬁnd
neighbors to exchange content, and it is also more likely to
ﬁnd nearby peers to achieve high P2P data-transfer throughput.
As a result, the peer upload capacity utilization is less than 1
but normally increases as the number of peers increases [28],
[18]. For our P2P streaming cooperative game, we model the
average upload bandwidth utilization as an increasing concave
function (jSj) of the streaming swarm size, with (jSj)
approaching 1 when the number of peers is large. Taking
into account the peers’ upload contribution, the server’s upload
bandwidth contribution is given by:
Ud(S) = 1 +
"
jSj   1   (jSj)min(jSj   1;
X
i2S
ui)
#
; (2)
where the ﬁrst term is the unavoidable server bandwidth cost
to stream at least one full copy of the video to the swarm,
the second term is the additional bandwidth the server has to
provide on top of peer upload contribution to ensure all peers
receive the video stream.
2) Cost-sharing Mechanism for ui  1: When ui  1 for
all i 2 A, so that each peer’s upload bandwidth is no more than
the video rate, server distribution cost can be approximated by
^ Ud(S) = jSj   (jSj)
X
i2S
ui =
X
i2S
(1   (jSj)ui); (3)
with approximation error bound  1  ^ Ud(S)   Ud(S)  0.
Using this minor approximation, the server cost becomes
c(S) = cc(S) + w
X
i2S
(1   (jSj)ui):
Therefore, a natural cost-sharing scheme for peer i with upload
capacity ui is:
Scheme-I: p(i;ui;S) ,
cc(jSj)
jSj
+ w(1   (jSj)ui); (4)where the ﬁrst term is the equal share of the content cost, the
second term is the distribution bandwidth cost discounted by
each peer’s upload contribution.
Theorem 3: Scheme-I is cross-monotone.
Proof: For all S;T  N and i 2 S, due to the concavity
of cc(),
cc(S)
jSj 
cc(S[T)
jS[Tj . Also since () is an increasing
function, we have (jSj)  (jS [ Tj). Therefore, we have
p(i;ui;S)  p(i;ui;S [ T), which satisﬁes the deﬁnition of
cross-monotone.
As part of the bidding, if each peer reveals its true upload
bandwidth (but not necessarily its true utility), then we can
directly apply the theory in Section III-A. In particular, it fol-
lows from Theorem 3, and Theorem 1 and 2 in Section III-A
that under the cost-sharing Scheme-I and the mechanism of
Algorithm 1, every peer will bid its true utility value, vi, and
Algorithm 1 returns the maximal service set S(v).
But it is more natural to suppose that each peer may not only
lie about its utility vi but also lie about its upload bandwidth
ui. In particular a peer (or a group of colluding peers) may
bid a higher upload bandwidth than it actually has in order to
increase its chances of being included in the swarm. In this
case, the bidding game is different from the traditional game
reviewed in Section III-A. Recall that in the traditional game,
the total cost c(S) and the cost share for each agent (i;S)
is determined only by the cooperation set S and not the bids.
But now, since the cost shares p(i;ui;S) depend on the bids
(the upload rates), the classical cooperative game theory no
longer directly applies. Algorithm 2 develops a cost-sharing
mechanism M(p) out of a cost-sharing scheme p for a P2P
cooperative game.
Algorithm 2 P2P Cost Sharing Mechanism M(p)
1: Each peer bids its utility and upload bandwidth hvi;uii;
2: Initialize Q   A.
3: Repeat
4: Let Q   fi 2 Q : vi  p(i;ui;Q)g.
5: Until for all i 2 Q;vi  p(i;ui;Q).
6: Return S = Q and pi = p(i;ui;Q), for all i 2 Q, pi = 0,
for all i = 2 Q.
To summarize the P2P cooperative game, the following
steps are taken:
1) We design a cost structure p(i;u;S) which in general
may depend on the vector of upload bandwidths u =
fui;i 2 Ag.
2) Each peer i bids hv0
i;u0
ii, which may or may not be
truthful.
3) After the bidding is completed, Algorithm 2 is used to
determine the set of participants S0 based on the hv0
i;u0
ii
values.
4) The P2P streaming is carried out over the set S0. Peer
i is charged according to his actual upload contribution
ui rather than his bidded upload capacity u0
i. The proﬁt
for peer i is given by vi   p(i;u;S0) when i 2 S0 and
is zero otherwise.
Theorem 4: In a P2P cooperative game, if the cost-sharing
scheme p is cross-monotone and the cost sharing of each peer
p(i;u;S) only depends on u through its own upload contri-
bution ui, then the cost-sharing mechanism M(p) deﬁned in
Algorithm 2 is group-strategyproof.
Proof: Let S be the service set returned by M(p) under
truthful bids. Since p is a cross-monotone cost-sharing scheme,
S is the unique maximal set satisfying vi   p(i;ui;S)  0,
8i 2 S.
We prove by contradiction. Speciﬁcally, suppose there is
a group of colluding peers C and associated bids hv0
i;u0
ii,
i 2 C, resulting in service set S0 returned by M(p), with the
following properties: (a) vi1(i 2 S0)   p(i;ui;S0)  vi1(i 2
S)   p(i;ui;S) holds for every i 2 C, and (b) there is at
least one i0 2 C such that vi01(i0 2 S0)   p(i0;ui0;S0) >
vi01(i0 2 S)   p(i0;ui0;S).
Consider a peer i 2 S0   C. Such a peer bids truthfully,
and according to the deﬁnition of M(p), we immediately have
vi p(i;ui;S0)  0. Now consider a colluding peer i 2 S0\C.
By (a) we have vi   p(i;ui;S0)  vi1(i 2 S)   p(i;ui;S). If
i 62 S, then it directly follows vi   p(i;ui;S0)  0. If i 2 S
then it follows vi   p(i;ui;S0)  vi   p(i;ui;S)  0, where
this last inequality follows from the property of S stated in
the ﬁrst paragraph of this proof. Combining these cases, we
have vi   p(i;ui;S0)  0, 8i 2 S0. Since S is the maximal
service set under truthful bid, then S0  S.
For (b) to hold, it is easy to see that i 2 S0 and thus
i 2 S. Thus, vi0   p(i0;ui0;S0) > vi0   p(i0;ui0;S). Then
p(i0;ui0;S0) < p(i0;ui0;S), which contradicts S0  S and p
is cross-monotone. Thus, M(p) is group-strategyproof.
Corollary 4.1: M(Scheme-I) is group-strategyproof.
3) Cost-sharing Scheme for the General Case: For the case
where there is at least one i 2 A, with ui > 1, the server
cost approximation in (3) can introduce considerable error for
some peer combinations. For this case, we need to design a
new cost-sharing scheme. Motivated by Scheme-I, it is natural
to consider Scheme-II to reward a peer by its relative upload
contribution:
p(i;ui;S) ,
cc(S)
jSj
+ w

1   min(1;
jSj   1
P
i2S ui
)ui(jSj)

;
where the ﬁrst term is equal content cost share, and the second
term is the adjusted peer upload contribution. Note that in
Scheme-II, the costs p(i;u;S) now depend on u and not just
on ui. It is straight-forward to establish the following result:
Theorem 5: Scheme-II is budget-balanced.
Although Scheme-II is very natural and budget-balanced, it
is neither cross-monotone nor group-strategyproof.
Theorem 6: Scheme-II is not cross-monotone.
Proof: We provide a counter example. Suppose we have
four peers, with upload bandwidth of 0;0;2;2 respectively.
When only the ﬁrst three peers form a coalition, S3 =f1;2;3g, the price for peer 3 is:
p(3;2;S3) =
cc(S3)
jS3j
+ w(1   min(1;
jS3j   1
P
i2S3 ui
)ui(jS3j))
=
cc(S3)
3
+ w(1   min(1;
2
2
)2(3))
=
cc(S3)
3
+ w(1   2(3))
When all four peers form a coalition, S4 = f1;2;3;4g, the
price for peer 3 is:
p(3;2;S4) =
cc(S4)
jS4j
+ w(1   min(1;
jS4j   1
P
i2S4 ui
)ui(jS4j))
=
cc(S4)
4
+ w(1   min(1;
3
4
)2(4))
=
cc(S4)
4
+ w(1  
3
2
(4))
If
cc(S3)
3  
cc(S4)
4 <
w(3)
2 , p(3;2;S3) < p(3;2;S4), establish-
ing that Scheme-II is not cross-monotone.
Theorem 7: Let M(Scheme-II) be the mechanism obtained
from Algorithm 2. M(Scheme-II) is not group-strategyproof.
Proof: We prove this using the example in the proof of
Theorem 6. Set the utility values large enough for all four
peers so that if they all bid truthfully, they will all be included
in the service set, that is, set vi  p(i;ui;S4);i = 1;2;3;4.
The cost shares for peer 3 and 4 are the same, as calculated
in (5):
p(3;2;S4) = p(4;2;S4) =
cc(S4)
4
+ w(1  
3
2
(4)):
Now suppose peer 3 announces that its upload bandwidth
is 10 instead of 2. The cost shares for peers 3 and 4 become
p0(3;10;S4) =
cc(S4)
4
+ w(1   min(1;
2
12
)10(4))
=
cc(S4)
4
+ w(1  
5
3
(4)) (5)
and
p0(4;2;S4) =
cc(S4)
4
+ w(1   min(1;
2
12
)2(4))
=
cc(S4)
4
+ w(1  
1
3
(4)) (6)
respectively. Thus, if we set peer 4’s utility value to v4 =
cc(S4)
4 + w(1   1
2(4)) < p0(4;2;S4), and set the other
three peers to have large values, then the resulting coalition
set for M(p0) becomes f1;2;3g. Since u1 = u2 = 0, it
is easy to check that the cost share allocated to peer 3 is
p0(3;10;S3) = p(3;2;S3) < p(3;2;S4) as shown in Theorem
6. Thus, because peer 3 gains beneﬁt by lying about its upload
bandwidth, M(Scheme-II) is not group-strategyproof.
Based on the above cost-sharing scheme, now consider
Scheme-III:
p(i;ui;S) =
cc(S)
jSj
+ w

1   min(1;
jSj   1
jSj u
)ui(jSj)

;
where  u denotes the average upload bandwidth of peers who
are watching the video. The value can be determined by the
server using historical data. It is straightforward to show that
Scheme-III is budget-balanced if  u.
Theorem 8: Scheme-III is cross-monotone.
Proof: For all S;T  A and i 2 S, we have p(i;ui;S) =
cc(S)
jSj +w(1 min(1;
jSj 1
jSj u )ui(jSj)), p(i;S[T) =
cc(S[T)
jS[Tj +
w(1 min(1;
jS[Tj 1
jS[Tj u )ui(jS[Tj)). Since cc() is a concave
function, we have
cc(S)
jSj 
cc(S[T)
jS[Tj . And since () is an in-
creasing function, we have
jSj 1
jSj u (jSj) 
jS[Tj 1
jS[Tj u (jS [Tj).
Thus, we have p(i;ui;S)  p(i;ui;S [ T), which is the
deﬁnition of cross-monotone.
Together with Theorem 1 and 2, we immediately have
Corollary 8.1: Let M(Scheme-III) be the mechanism ob-
tained from Algorithm 2. M(Scheme-III) is group strategy-
proof.
C. Multi-Version P2P Streaming
Now suppose there are J video versions with decreasing
video rates r1 > r2 >  > rJ. Similar to the single-version
case, there is a set A of peers. Peer i has upload capacity
of ui, and video utility vi. We assume each peer i ﬁrst and
foremost wants to watch the highest video rate allowed by its
utility budget vi. After being assigned to the highest possible
video rate, it desires to pay the lowest possible price without
changing the assigned rate.
Let Sj be the set of peers watching version j. We set the
pricing scheme for peer i watching video version j based on
Scheme-III:
pj(i;ui;Sj) = cj(jSjj)+w(rj min(1;
(jSjj   1)rj
jSij uj
)ui(jSjj));
(7)
where cj(jSjj) , c
(j)
c (jSjj)=jSjj is the content price for
version j,  uj is the expected upload bandwidth of peers
watching version j.
Algorithm 3 Top-Down Multi-Round Bidding for Multi-
version P2P Streaming
1: Each peer bids its utility and upload bandwidth hvi;uii;
2: Initialize S   A.
3: for j = 1;:::;J do
4: T = S
5: REPEAT
6: Let S   fi 2 S : vi  pj(i;ui;S)g.
7: Until for all i 2 S;vi  pj(i;ui;S).
8: Sj = S; Ri = rj, for all i 2 Sj;
9: S = T   Sj;
10: If S = ; then Stop.
11: end for
12: If S 6= ; then Ri = 0 for all i 2 S;
Algorithm 3 selects video rate Ri for each peer i. It starts
from the highest video rate. Once a peer is selected to watch
a particular video rate, it is not considered for the lower
video rates. When each peer has been allocated to some
video version, or all video versions have been considered, the
algorithm ends.Theorem 9: Top-down bidding in Algorithm 3 is group-
strategyproof.
Proof: Given peer bids, Algorithm 3 determines the video
version for each peer. Let Sj;1  j  J, be the set of peers
assigned to video version j if all peers bid truthfully. Suppose
a set C of peers collude in bidding. Peer i 2 C bids with
hv0
i;u0
ii 6= hvi;uii. Let S0
j;1  j  J, be the new peer video
rate assignments returned by the top-down bidding algorithm.
Start with video version j = 1. Since p1(i;ui;S1) satisﬁes
the condition of Theorem 4, using the same argument in the
proof of Theorem 4, it can be shown that S0
1  S1.
1) If some colluders are allocated to the highest video
version in the truthful bidding case, i.e. if C \ S1 6= ;, since
colluders cannot suffer loss, those colluders should still be
allocated to the highest version, i.e., C\S1  S0
1. Additionally,
they should not be charged with a higher price than in the
truthful bid case, i.e., p1(i;ui;S0
1)  p1(i;ui;S1). Due to the
cross-monotonicity of p1(), we must have S0
1 = S1.
2) If no colluder is allocated to the highest video version in
the truthful bidding case, i.e. C \ S1 = ;, even under group
collusion, all peers in S1 still bid truthfully, and they all will
survive in the ﬁrst round of bidding for the highest video rate,
i.e, S1  S0
1. Combining with S0
1  S1, we also have S0
1 = S1.
Summarizing the previous two cases, we will always have
S0
1 = S1. According to the top-down bidding process, the
set of peers participating in bidding for video rate j = 2
is the same as the set under truthful bidding. The previous
arguments can be applied similarly for second-round bidding
game to show that S0
2 = S2. Repeating the arguments for all
video versions, we can show that S0
j = Sj, 1  j  J. Then
each colluder will be allocated to the same video rate and
charged with the same price. Therefore, no peer can beneﬁt
from collusion. Thus, the top-down bidding mechanism in
Algorithm 3 is group-strategyproof.
IV. DYNAMIC P2P STREAMING ALGORITHM
Now we use the cost-sharing mechanisms developed in the
previous section to guide the video rate selection of peers
in dynamic P2P streaming. We develop distributed dynamic
P2P streaming algorithms – consisting of chunk scheduling,
token-based accounting, and video version switching – to
dynamically adjust peers’ video rates based on collaborative
behaviors of all peers.
A. Multi-swarm Chunk Scheduling
Each version of the video is divided into video chunks, each
of which has video playback time of . All peers watching
the same version form a P2P streaming swarm and exchange
video chunks. When a peer decides to switch from version j
to version j0, it simply leaves the swarm j and joins swarm j0.
For each swarm, we employ a mesh-pull based P2P streaming
design [16]. In such a design, a tracker keeps track of all the
peers in the swarms. A newly joined peer receives an initial list
of peers from the tracker, and randomly connects to a subset
of them. Additional peer lists can be obtained from connected
neighbors. Peers obtain video chunks from their neighbors or
the server. Each peer maintains a sliding window of chunks to
download, moving forward at the video playback rate. Peers
exchange with their neighbors their buffer-maps, indicating
which chunks are available in their local cache buffers.
For chunk download scheduling, a peer employs a hybrid
of oldest-ﬁrst and rarest-ﬁrst strategies [29]: 1) a chunk close
to its playback deadline is given high download priority; 2)
among chunks far away from their deadlines, chunks that are
less available among neighbors are given higher download
priority to create chunk diversity among neighbors for P2P
sharing. To maximally ofﬂoad the server, a peer ﬁrst requests
a chunk from its neighbors if it is available. When a chunk is
available from multiple neighbors, to give all peers the same
chance to contribute their upload bandwidth, as assumed in
the pricing mechanism (7), the request will be sent to the
neighbor with the lowest upload bandwidth utilization. This
also balances neighbor workloads, and consequently chunk
download delays. If all neighbors are overloaded, the peer
either downloads the chunk from the server in this round,
or waits and downloads from neighbors in future rounds.
If the chunk is very close to its playback deadline, it will
be downloaded directly from the server; otherwise it will be
downloaded from the server in the current round with a certain
probability, calculated from a decreasing function of the chunk
availability in its neighbors. For chunk upload scheduling, we
employ a simple First-Come-First-Serve policy at the peers
and at the server.
B. Token-based Accounting
We implement the cost-sharing mechanisms proposed in
Section III using tokens, which are exchanged among the
server and peers. Each peer buys tokens from the server
periodically at the rate determined by its video utility value.
Speciﬁcally, if the video duration is T, and peer i’s utility
value for the video is vi, then peer i buys tokens at rate
vi=T. To facilitate chunk-based P2P video streaming and video
switching, we employ chunk-based mini-payments: when a
peer downloads a chunk, it pays the distribution cost to the up-
loader (either the server or another peer), and the content cost
to the server. The content and distribution costs are calculated
using the cost-sharing schemes designed in Section III.
For the clarity of presentation, suppose time is slotted with
unit time interval, and peers only switch video versions at the
end of each time slot. At the beginning of time slot k, for
peer i, let Bi(k) be its token balance, ji(k) its current video
version, and rji(k) the corresponding video rate. Let Di(k)
and Ui(k) be the total number of chunks downloaded and
uploaded, respectively, by peer i within time slot k. Let Sj(k)
be the set of peers watching video version j in time slot k.
The token balance on peer i is updated as:
Bi(k + 1) = max

0;Bi(K) +
vi
T
+ Ui(k)
wrji(k)
T
 Di(k)

wrji(k)
T
+
cji(k)(jSji(k)(k)j)
T

;
(8)where the vi=T is the number of tokens bought by peer i
according to utility vi, wrji(k)=T is per-chunk distribution
cost for version ji(k), Ui(k)wrji(k)=T is the number of
tokens earned by peer i by uploading Ui(k) chunks of version
ji(k) to other peers, and the last term is the number of
tokens paid by peer i for downloading Di(k) chunks, with
cji(k)(jSji(k)(k)j)=T being the per-peer per-chunk content
cost of version ji(k) shared between jSji(k)(k)j peers.
To maintain smooth playback, we will have Di(k) = 1=,
the average upload rate of peer i within time slot k is
~ u(k) = Ui(k)rji(k). To sustain token balance growth while
continuously watching version j, peer i should have
vi
T
+
w~ u(k)
T

wrji(k)
T
+
cji(k)(jSji(k)(k)j)
T
:
The left part is the rate peer i earns tokens, and the right part
is the rate peer i consumes tokens. Equivalently, we have
vi  cji(k)(jSji(k)(k)j) + w(rji(k)   ~ u(k)): (9)
Compared with (7), the right part of (9) is the cost-share of
peer i for version ji(k), given its real upload contribution of
~ u(k).
C. Dynamic Video Rate Switching
Based on the token balance, and the rate tokens are earned
and consumed, peers make their video switching decisions.
1) Switching-Up: If a peer’s token balance is high, then its
current video rate is likely lower than what it can afford, so
the peer should consider switching-up to a higher rate. Before
switching-up to swarm j, the peer estimates whether it will
be able to afford to watch at a higher rate in swarm j. We
assume a peer can obtain the current content price cj(jSj(k)j)
of version j from the tracker. For a peer to estimate its
upload contribution if it switches to version j, the tracker also
provides the peer the upload bandwidth utilizations (Sj(k))
in the target swarm j. Peer i then calculates its net token
growth rate if it were to switch to version j:
I(i;j;Sj(k)) =
vi + w(ui  (Sj(k))   rj)   cj(jSj(k)j)
T
(10)
If I(i;j;Sj(k)) > 0, peer i is expected to have token balance
growth after switching to version j. Even if I(i;j;Sj(k)) < 0,
with current token balance Bi(k), peer i can switch to version
j for a time period of Bi(k)=jI(i;j;Sj(k))j. Peer i can switch
to the highest version j such that Bi(k)   I(i;j;Sj(k)),
where  is the duration threshold to avoid frequent switches.
2) Switching-Down: A peer has to switch down to a
lower version if its token balance hits zero. Similar to the
switch-up case, with information from the tracker, a peer can
calculate its net token growth rate at any lower video version
using (10), and switch down to the highest version j with
I(i;j;Sj(k))  0.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
To evaluate the performance of the proposed dynamic P2P
streaming mechanisms and algorithms, we implemented an
event-driven P2P streaming simulator based on the source C++
code provided by [30]. The simulator can simulate chunk-
level P2P streaming and end-to-end latency among end peers.
We extended it to support multiple streaming rates and im-
plemented our chunk scheduling, token-based accounting and
video version switching algorithms. As commonly assumed in
P2P system study, we simulate an environment where the peer
uplinks are the only bandwidth bottlenecks. The simulation
has totally 200 peers, with one node being the server and the
remaining 199 nodes being the peers. We created six different
classes of peers according to Table I. The server has no upload
bandwidth limit.
TABLE I: Peer Classes based on Utility and Bandwidth
Class Index Bandwidth(Mbps) Utility Node Count
0 5.0 1.2 30
1 5.0 0.9 30
2 3.0 0.8 40
3 3.0 0.6 40
4 1.0 0.6 30
5 1.0 0.3 29
There are totally 6 different video rates which are
0:5Mbps;1:5Mbps;2:5Mbps;3:5Mbps;4:5Mbps;5:5Mbps.
We run each simulation for 10;000 seconds. We set the
playback time of a chunk to 200 msec and the initial startup
buffer delay to 4 seconds, i.e., the playback starts when the
peer has obtained 20 consecutive chunks. During playback,
if one chunk is missing, the current playback lag determines
the playback freezing duration before moving to the next
chunk. In our implementation, if the current playback lag
is smaller than 6 seconds, the maximum freezing time is 2
seconds; if the current playback lag is between 6 seconds and
20 seconds, the maximum freezing time is 0:6 second; if the
accumulated playback lag is more than 30 seconds, missing
chunks will be skipped immediately.
A. P2P Chunk Scheduling Efﬁciency
We ﬁrst demonstrate that our chunk scheduling algorithm
is efﬁcient for video streaming. For this purpose, we disable
token accounting and force all peers to watch the same version
at rate 4:5Mbps. Fig.1 shows CDF of the chunk download
delays for peers at different upload bandwidth levels. Fig.1
shows that all chunks can be downloaded well before the
initial playback delay of 4 seconds. No playback freezing is
observed. Table II shows the average peer upload rate, peer
upload capacity utilization, the download ratio from the server,
the percentage of chunks downloaded directly from the server,
and the average playback delay. We can see that the chunk
playback delay is just a little longer than pre-set initial startup
delay of 4 seconds. We can see from Table II that our chunk
scheduling algorithm can achieve close to 100% peer upload
capacity utilization. Since the average peer upload capacity is
3Mbps, about 36% percent of the 4:5Mbps video stream has
to be downloaded from the server. This set of simulations
demonstrates that our chunk scheduling algorithm is very0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
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Fig. 1: Chunk Download Delay CDF without Switching
TABLE II: Chunk Scheduling Efﬁciency without Switching
Capacity Upload Upload Download from Playback
Level Rate (Mbps) Utiliz. (%) Server (%) Delay(sec)
0 4.99 99.8 44.2 4.34
1 2.74 91.3 27.6 4.57
2 0.91 91.0 39.8 4.50
efﬁcient in utilizing peer upload capacity for high quality live
streaming.
B. Dynamic Streaming with Content Cost
To test the token-based accounting and dynamic video
switching, we ﬁrst conduct simulations with both content and
distribution charges. The bandwidth price is set to w = 1,
and the content price for video version j is set as cj(jSjj) =
2  rj  (jSjj), where () is a piece-wise constant group
discount function of the group size, as deﬁned in Table III.
When more peers watch the same version, each of them will
get a lower content price.
TABLE III: Group Content Discount Factor
Group Size 1  9 10  19 20  29 30  39 40  199
Per-peer Price 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6
We study peer dynamic video switching with and without
going through the top-down bidding. Without bidding, each
peer starts with the lowest video rate of 0:5Mbps, and
dynamically switches up to higher rates as its token balance
grows. With bidding, each peer participates in the top-down
bidding and obtains its initial video rate assignment. We use
the average peer upload bandwidth of 3Mbps as  u. A peer
initially joins the video swarm for the assigned rate. After
joining, the peer adjusts its video rate dynamically based on
its token balance. In our simulations, both with and without
bidding, video rates on peers converge quickly. Table IV
compares the distributions of the converged video rates for
different classes of peers in both cases.
We can see from Table IV, both with and without bidding,
peers in class 5 get stuck at the lowest rate, due to their low
utility and bandwidth values; peers in class 4, since they have
a higher utility, accumulate tokens and are able to watch at rate
1:5Mbps; peers in class 3 also watch at rate 1:5Mbps; peers in
class 2 watch at 2:5Mbps. We can see that without bidding, all
TABLE IV: Video Rate Distribution of Different Classes
Class Index 0 1 2 3 4 5
Average Video Rate(Mbps)
Start with Lowest Rate 2.5 2.5 2.5 1.5 1.5 0.5
Average Video Rate(Mbps)
Start with Bidding Rate 3.5 3.5 2.5 1.5 1.5 0.5
peers in class 0 and 1 can increase their rates only to 2:5Mbps,
which is lower than their assigned rate of 3:5Mbps, calculated
by the top-down bidding algorithm. Meanwhile, if the peers
instead start with their bidding-assigned rates, they can watch
3:5Mbps throughout the whole simulation, as indicated in
Table IV. This is because when each peer starts with the lowest
rate and switches up independently, they cannot coordinate
to get the group discount in Table III, then they don’t have
enough balance to switch up to higher rate. Speciﬁcally, for
the ﬁrst peer attempting to switch to a high rate swarm, when
it predicts its token growth rate after switching using (9),
there is no group discount since there is no other peer in that
swarm. The total predicted price might be higher than its utility
value, in which case it decides to stay at the current rate. This
applies to the subsequent attempts as well. As a result, no
peer will jump up to that swarm. On the other hand, if they
coordinate and synchronously jump up to a higher swarm, the
group discount will allow them to maintain a positive token
growth rate and watch high quality video. The initial top-down
bidding therefore provides a means for peers to cooperate and
collaboratively improve their video experience.
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Fig. 2: Performance with/without Initial Bidding
Fig 2 compares the average peer upload bandwidth uti-
lization, download ratio from the server, and playback delay
of each class for without and with bidding. From Fig 2(a)
and 2(b), we can see that for peers in class 0, 1 and 2,0 1000 2000 3000 4000 50006000 7000 8000 900010000
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Fig. 3: Domino Effect of Peer Utility Change
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Fig. 4: Oscillations in Aggressive Switch-ups
their bandwidth utilization can get large improvement with
initial bidding. For peers in class 3, 4 and 5, because their
bandwidth is small, they don’t get much improvement on their
bandwidth utilization. Fig 2(c) shows that the download ratio
from the ratio becomes a little bit larger with initial bidding,
this happens because average video rate of class index 0, 1
and 2 with initial bidding is higher than that of without initial
bidding, as shown in Table IV. Also, we can see from Fig 2(d)
that playback delay is still short after applying initial bidding.
The server upload bandwidth is mostly used to stream chunks
close to their deadlines. The streaming performance is stable
across the peers watching different rates. Due to the content
pricing, peers cannot watch video rates matching their upload
capacities. This leads to peer upload bandwidth utilization that
is lower than 100%.
To test the adaptivity of our system, we change the utility
value of class 0 from 1:2 to 0:3 at 2;000 seconds into the
simulation. Fig.3 shows the video download rate ﬂuctuations
after that. There is no change for peers in class 5 and 4; Fig.3
only shows the average video download rates of peers in class
0;1;2;3.
The average video rate of class 0 starts to drop at about 500
seconds after the change. It doesn’t drop immediately because
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Fig. 5: Video Rate Switching Triggered by Upload Bandwidth
Changes
it takes some time for the peers to deplete their token balances.
As class 0 peers leave the 3:5Mbps swarm, the content price
for version 3:5Mbps increases according to Table III. The
token balance for class 1 peers then starts to decrease. The
content price increases at faster pace as more peers leave
the swarm, leading to a domino effect for switching down
for peers in class 1 at approximately 4;000 seconds into the
simulation. Interestingly, the average video rate of class 2 also
decreases slightly towards the end of the simulation. As more
class 0 and class 1 peers switch down to 2:5Mbps, more chunk
download requests will go to them instead of to class 2 peers.
Because some class 2 peers cannot earn enough tokens from
chunk uploading, they will be forced to switch down to a lower
rate. Class 3 peers are not inﬂuenced, because the 1:5Mbps
swarm is not affected by class-0 utility changes.
For the above simulations, a peer switches up to video rate j
only if the expected token growth rate I(i;j;Sj(k)), calculated
by (10), is positive. As discussed in Section IV-C, a peer can
also aggressively switch up to level j even if the expected
token growth rate is negative, but its balance allows it to stay
there for  time, i.e., Bi(k)   I(i;j;Sj(k)). If the pre-
dicted growth rate is correct, the peer will have to switch down
when the token balance depletes. We conducted simulations
for the aggressive switch up strategy with  = 10 minutes. As
shown in Fig.4, as expected, aggressively switching-up triggers
many video rate oscillations. And also, we can see that the
period of the oscillation is about 10 minutes as expected. This
is acceptable when the remaining video time is less than 
because even the token growth rate is negative, the existing
balance can afford video time of  at a high rate.
C. Dynamic Streaming with Free Content
When content is free, the video rate watched by a peer is
mainly determined by its own utility value and its real upload
contribution. We now reduce peer utility values as shown in
Table V. In this case, the token balance growth rate is largely
dependent on a peer’s real upload contribution. Both with and
without bidding, the dynamic video rate adjustment algorithm
will drive peers to swarms corresponding to their utility values
and upload contributions. This is because there is no group
discount factor for content any more. Due to space limit,
we only present results for dynamic rate switching triggeredTABLE V: Settings for Content-Free Simulation
Class Index Bandwidth(Mbps) Utility Node Count
0 5.0 0.1 30
1 5.0 0.07 30
2 3.0 0.1 40
3 3.0 0.07 40
4 1.0 0.1 30
5 1.0 0.07 29
by upload bandwidth changes. We conduct simulations by
changing the bandwidth of class 0 to 2:5Mbps and class 4
to 2Mbps at 2000 seconds into the simulation The video
download rates of all classes are plotted in Fig.5.
We can see that class 4 peers switch up from 0:5Mbps
to 1:5Mbps immediately, and the video rate of class 0 peers
drops down after some time. This is because it takes some
time to deplete the token balances. Some class 1 peers also
switch up, since they have a better chance to earn tokens with
some class 0 peers switching down. But as more class 0 peers
switch down, the swarm becomes smaller and many previously
switched-up class 1 peers switch back. The peers from classes
2 and 3 are almost unaffected.
VI. CONCLUSION
Dynamic video streaming is a new trend on the Internet.
While all existing dynamic streaming solutions are server-
based, P2P dynamic streaming holds a great potential. The suc-
cess of P2P dynamic streaming hinges on incentive mechanism
design. In this paper, we use cooperative game theory to study
the incentive issues in P2P dynamic streaming. We developed
cost-sharing mechanisms for peers watching the same video
version. We also developed a top-down multi-round bidding
mechanism for heterogeneous peers to select video versions
that are commensurate with their upload contributions and
the prices they are willing to pay. We showed that our
cost-sharing and bidding mechanisms are budget-balanced
and group-strategyproof. Using insights obtained from the
game-theoretic study, we developed a P2P dynamic streaming
system, consisting of multi-swarm chunk scheduling, token-
based accounting, and video version switching, to dynamically
adjust each peer’s video version based on the collaborative
behavior of all peers. Through simulations, we demonstrated
the efﬁciency of the proposed P2P incentive mechanism and
dynamic streaming algorithm.
As future work, we will reﬁne our P2P dynamic streaming
system design. We will improve the robustness of the current
streaming algorithm within each video swarm as peers dy-
namically switch between versions. We will further investigate
the trade-off between the smoothness and responsiveness of
peer video version switching, leveraging on our recent study
on server-based dynamic streaming [31]. Finally, we plan to
develop a P2P dynamic streaming prototype and test it through
experiments over the Internet.
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